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Abstract
This study presents a two-class, overlapping-generation model featuring social
mobility inhibited by the mismatch of talents. Mobility decreases as the private
education gap between the two classes widens, whereas it increases with an increased
public education spending. Within this framework, we consider the redistributive
politics of public education and show that the private education gap provides the
government with an incentive to increase public education. We also show that social
mobility reveals a cyclical motion across generations when the political power of the
poor is weak.
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1 Introduction
Social mobility is dened as the transition between income classes (Atkinson, 1978, 1981).
Higher social mobility implies that children born in poor families are more likely to be
rich, regardless of their family background. Several studies have analyzed the mechanism
underlying social mobility using lifecycle models. They assume that an individual's wage
is determined by his/her education level, luck, and family background (Becker and Tomes,
1979; Davis et al., 2005, Ichino et al., 2011) and the probability of being rich depends on
education received in one's childhood (Simon Fan and Stark, 2008; Cremer et al., 2010;
Simon Fan and Zhang, 2013).
Although the aforementioned studies identify several factors that critically aect social
mobility, they ignore the mismatch of talents, which also plays a crucial role. An exception
is Bernasconi and Profeta (2012), who assume that an individual's innate ability is private
information, and individual economic success depends on these innate abilities as well as
family background. This assumption allows them to present the mismatch of talents:
individuals are assigned to a social class that does not reect their innate ability. Within
this framework, Bernasconi and Profeta (2012) show that the provision of public education
removes the bias toward family background, reduces the mismatch of talents, and thus,
encourages social mobility.
Bernasconi and Prioeta's (2012) ndings suggest the role of public education in re-
solving the mismatch of talents. Further, private education, which works as a supplement
or complement to public education, is abstracted in their analysis. However, several stud-
ies on mobility indicate that private education also plays an important role in economic
success (Davis et al., 2005; Ichino et al., 2011; Simon Fan and Zhang, 2013). In addi-
tion, the evidence suggests that the ratio of private education to education expenditure is
high in many OECD countries. For example, in Chile, Korea, the United States, Japan,
Australia, and Israel, this ratio is above 20% (Figure 1).
[Figure 1 here.]
This study aims to analyze the role of private education in social mobility. To do so,
we introduce private education into Bernasconi and Profeta's (2012) framework. Their
model is a two-period, overlapping-generation model in which agents live in two periods:
childhood and adulthood. In childhood, agents receive compulsory education provided by
the government and private education paid for by their parents. The government decides
the level of public spending and allocation of tax revenue for public education and lump-
sum transfer through voting. In particular, the present study employs a probabilistic
voting mechanism, which enables us to demonstrate the eect of each social class' political
power on redistributive policy programs.
Within this framework, we show that public education encourages social mobility,
while private education discourages it. In particular, rich parents invest more in private
education than poor parents. The private investment gap between them gives rich-born
children an advantage over poor-born children in educational success. This in turn de-
creases social mobility in the economy. Therefore, social mobility increases (decreases)
provided the positive eect of public education dominates (is dominated by) the negative
eect of private education.
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To understand the role of private education more precisely, we compute the public
education-to-GDP and lump-sum transfer-to-GDP ratios and compare them to those in
Bernasconi and Profeta (2012). In the present framework, an increase in the lump-sum
transfer decreases the poor-born children's probability of being rich because the transfer
works to expand the private investment gap between the rich and the poor. This in-
centivizes the poor in preferring more public education spending. Therefore, the public
education-to-GDP ratio is higher and the lump-sum transfer-to-GDP ratio is lower than
those in Bernasconi and Profeta's (2012) model.
We also investigate the dynamics of GDP and social mobility and show that they
depend on the relative political power between the rich and poor. When the political
power of the poor is strong, GDP and social mobility monotonically converge to the steady
state. The strong political power of the poor incentivizes the government to implement
a high tax rate, thereby resulting in low income inequality and a small gap in private
investment between the rich and poor. Therefore, the positive eect of public education
on social mobility always dominates the negative eect of the private investment gap; this
results in an increase in social mobility and GDP.
However, GDP and social mobility cyclically converge to the steady state when the
political power of the rich is strong. A weak political power of the poor incentivizes the
government to implement a low tax rate and incur low redistribution expenditures. This
creates a two-period cycles of income inequality as follows: in a high inequality state, the
private investment gap is large. Because of this large gap, the negative eect on social
mobility dominates the positive eect of public education, resulting in a decrease in social
mobility, GDP, and income inequality in the next period. The opposite eect occurs in
a low inequality state: a negative eect of the private investment gap is dominated by
the positive eect of public education, which results in an increase in social mobility,
GDP, and income inequality in the next period. This cyclical motion of GDP and social
mobility, which is not shown in Bernasconi and Profeta (2012), is created by the presence
of private education.
The two patterns of social mobility can be associated with the fact that some developed
countries have experienced the dierent motions of social mobility over the past decades.
For example, the social mobility has monotonically increased over the past decades in
Norway (Bratberg et al., 2007), whereas it has changed non-monotonically in Finland
(Pekkala and Lucas, 2007) and in the United States (Aaronson and Mazuder, 2008). The
present results can be viewed as providing a possible explanation for the cross-country
dierences in social mobility trends.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the economic
environment. Section 3 demonstrates the utility maximization of parents and characterizes
political equilibrium. Section 4 studies the dynamics of GDP and social mobility and
performs a numerical analysis. Section 5 provides concluding remarks.
2 Model
Drawing on Bernasconi and Profeta's (2012) model, this section introduces a discrete-
time overlapping generations model. Each individual lives for two periods: childhood
and adulthood. In childhood, individuals make no economic decision but accumulate
human capital through education. In adulthood, individuals work to earn income, give
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birth to one child, and decide consumption and the quantity of private education for
their children. In addition, they vote on economic policies, that is, public education and
lump-sum transfers. Assuming that each adult individual has one child, the size of each
generation becomes unity.
2.1 Innate Ability and Occupation
Individuals are endowed with either high innate ability, AH , or low innate ability, AL.
The ratio of these two types of individuals is assumed to be one across generations. In
other words, the distribution of innate ability is constant across generations.
Figure 2 illustrates the transmission of innate ability from a parent to a child. Here,
innate ability transmits from a parent to a child with an exogenous probability q. For
example, a child whose parent is endowed with high innate ability is endowed with high
ability with probability q, but endowed with low ability with a probability 1   q. It is
assumed that children and parents are unable to observe this probability. The role of this
assumption will be further discussed in Section 3.1.
[Figure 2 here.]
In each period t, individuals can access two types of occupations, a high and low
income occupation. At the beginning of adulthood, each individual is assigned to either
of the occupations, following the mechanism demonstrated in Section 2.2. Individuals
employed in a high (low)-income occupation belong to the rich (poor) class. In period t,
rich and poor adults obtain the wages yRt and y
P
t , where the superscripts R and P denote
\rich" and \poor," and the subscript t denotes period t. The wages yRt and y
P
t depend on
human capital endowments, which will be modeled in Section 4. In Sections 2 and 3, we
proceed with the analysis by taking yRt and y
P
t as given.
2.2 Imperfect Information and Mismatch of Talents
When individuals' innate ability is observable, every individual earns income which reects
his/her own innate ability. That is, an individual who is endowed with low (high) innate
ability gets a low (high)-income occupation. Thus, there is no mismatch of talent in the
economy. However, in the real world, individuals' innate ability is unobservable to others,
resulting in a mismatch of talents. Some individuals who are endowed with low (high)
ability get high (low)-income occupation.
Let 1  mt+1 denote the fraction of period-t + 1 workers who belong to the \wrong"
social class. That is, they have high innate ability but become poor or have low innate
ability but become rich. Therefore, the fraction mt+1 of period-t+1 workers belong to the
\correct" social class. They have high innate ability and become rich or have low innate
ability and become poor.
To demonstrate the mechanism that determines 1 mt+1 and mt+1, the following two
assumptions, which are in line with those in Bernasconi and Profeta (2012), are imposed
on the present model.
(A1) If the innate ability of the child is the same level as that of his/her parent's income,
then the child earns income that reects his innate ability with the probability 1.
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(A2) If innate ability of the child diers from the level of his/her parent's income, then
the child earns an income that reects his/her innate ability with probability t+1
or does not earn an income that reects his/her innate ability with the probability
1  t+1.
The probability t+1 is assumed to be determined by the following equation:
t+1 =
(1  c) + d 

et   ln
 
sRt =s
P
t

(1 mt)q +mt(1  q) ; c; d > 0; (1)
where et is the amount of public education per child and s
R
t (s
P
t ) is the amount of private
education per child invested by rich (poor) parents. As for the denominator, the term
(1 mt)q is the fraction of children whose innate ability diers from that of their parents'
income and their parents face a mismatch of talents. The term mt(1 q) is the fraction of
children whose innate ability diers from their parents' income level and their parents do
not face a mismatch of talents. Thus, the denominator of Equation (1) is the fraction of
children whose innate ability does not reect their parents' income level, and thus, may
face a mismatch of talents. Figure 3 illustrates the process of a talent mismatch.
[Figure 3 here.]
The numerator of Equation (1) captures the degree to which a society prevents the
mismatch of talents. In particular, (1 c) measures the degree to which a society prevents
the mismatch of talents irrespective of education, while d indicates the extent to which
education aects the mismatch of talents. Therefore, a higher t+1 implies that children
whose ability diers from their parents' income level are more likely to attain occupations
that reect their own innate ability. Details about the numerator of Equation (1) will be
explained in Section 2.3.
The formation of the probability t+1 follows that in Bernasconi and Profeta (2012).
However, the present formation diers from theirs in that the private investment gap be-
tween the rich and poor, (sRt =s
P
t ), works as an additional factor that aects the probability
t+1. Under the assumption that the ratio of the two types of individuals' innate ability
is one across generations, this formation has the zero-sum game nature of the mismatch
of talents. As a result of this nature, private investment by parents aects not only the
probability of the mismatch of talents of their own children but also that of other children.
Therefore, it is natural to assume that probability t+1 depends on the private investment
gap.
Use of Equation (1), we write the fraction of workers allocated to the correct social
class in period t+ 1 as follows (see Appendix A.1 for the derivation):
mt+1 = 2 

c  d 

et   ln
 
sRt =s
P
t
  q +mt(2q   1): (2)
Figure 4 illustrates the relationship between the talent mismatch of a child and the level
of his/her parent's income.
[Figure 4 here.]
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2.3 Education and Social Mobility
Given the probabilities q and t+1, we are now able to link education and social mobility.
Let ~qt+1 denote the probability of social persistence, namely the probability that the social
class of a child is identical to that of his/her parent. The probability ~qt+1 is obtained as
follows (see Appendix A.2 for the derivation):
~qt+1 = c  d 

et   ln
 
sRt =s
P
t

: (3)
Social mobility is dened as the probability that the social class of a child diers from
that of his/her parents. It is given by 1  ~qt+1, or
1  ~qt+1 = 1  c+ d 

et   ln
 
sRt =s
P
t

: (4)
The right-hand side of Equation (4) is identical to the numerator of Equation (1), which
captures social mobility. It is immediate from Equation (4) that @(1 ~qt+1)
@et
> 0 and
@(1 ~qt+1)
@(sRt =s
P
t )
< 0 hold. Social mobility is enhanced by public education, but it is lowered
as the private investment gap widens.1
3 Political Competition
This section focuses on period t. Parents make economic and political decisions in each
period t. In particular, they determine consumption and private investment in the eco-
nomic decision and vote on the lump-sum transfer, public education, and income tax in
the political decision.
In period t, events take place as follows: (1) parents work to earn income yit and
give birth to one child (2) parents vote on both the tax rate t and the fraction t (3)
parents decide consumption cit and the private education investment in their children, s
i
t
(4) children benet from private and public education, and at the same time, become
aware of their own innate ability, and (5) children's human capital hi;jt+1, social mobility
1  ~qt+1 in period t+ 1, and the fraction mt+1 are determined. We solve the model using
backward induction.
3.1 Individual Preferences
Consider a parent with income yit (i = R;P ). They are taxed at the rate t on wage income
and receive lump-sum transfer bt. They consume private goods and invest privately in
their child. The budget constraint for a parent with income yit is given by
cit + s
i
t  (1  t)yit + bt; i = R;P; (5)
1Equation (4) can be rewritten as follows
1  ~qt+1 = 1  c+ d 
 
et   ln sRt + ln sPt

:
From @(1 ~qt+1)
@sRt
< 0 and @(1 ~qt+1)
@sPt
> 0, an higher private investment by the rich and poor parents increases
the probability of their own child becoming rich, as in Simon Fan and Zhang (2012). It is important to
note that private education has externalities, which means that an increase in private investment by the
rich (poor) parents decreases the probability that the children of the poor (rich) parents become rich.
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where cit and s
i
t denote consumption and private investment.
The formation of human capital is aected by the following four factors: public educa-
tion (et), private education (s
i
t), average human capital in the economy (H t), and innate
ability (Aj). For example, consider an individual who is born in period t and endowed
with Aj. If his/her parent has income yit, his/her human capital in adulthood, h
i;j
t+1, is
formulated as
hi;jt+1 = e

t
 
sit

H

tA
j; i = R;P; j = H;L; (6)
where (> 0), (> 0), and (> 0) are exogenously given, and hi;jt+1 denotes the human
capital of an agent endowed with Aj, whose parent is i(= R;P ).
Parents care about consumption and their children's social status. They are unable
to know the probability of talent transmission q and observe the innate ability of their
children. They use their belief about their children's innate ability, which is based on the
ex-post probability, ~qt+1, when they invest in their children. In particular, a child whose
parent is poor has low innate ability AL if he/she becomes poor with probability ~qt+1 and
high innate ability AH if he/she becomes rich with probability 1  ~qt+1. Similarly, a child
whose parent is rich has high innate ability AH if he/she becomes rich with probability
~qt+1 low innate ability A
L if he/she becomes poor with probability 1   ~qt+1. Therefore,
the expected utility functions of the poor and rich parents are given by
U(cPt ; s
P
t ) = ln c
P
t + ~qt+1 lnh
P;L
t+1 + (1  ~qt+1) lnhP;Ht+1 ; (7)
U(cRt ; s
R
t ) = ln c
R
t + ~qt+1 lnh
R;H
t+1 + (1  ~qt+1) lnhR;Lt+1 : (8)
Under the probability equation in (3), the budget constraint in (5), and the human
capital production function in (6), a parent decides consumption and private education
investment in his/her child to maximize utility. The maximization problem of a type-i
parent is as follows:
max
cit;s
i
t
U(cit; s
i
t);
subject to (3); (5) and (6):
Solving this problem leads to the following consumption and investment functions:
c^it(t; t)  cit
 
t; bt(t; t)

=
1
1 + 
 
(1  t)yit + bt

; (9)
s^it(t; t)  sit
 
t; bt(t; t)

=

1 + 
 
(1  t)yit + bt

; i = P;R; (10)
where  is denoted by
  d(lnAH   lnAL) + :
The fraction 1
1+
of the after-tax income ((1  t)yit + bt) is used for consumption and 1+
is used for private education investment.
3.2 Period-t Political Equilibrium
This subsection demonstrates the political decision of parents to characterize a period-t
political equilibrium. The government representing parents imposes a proportional tax
rate t on both the poor and rich parents. The fraction t of tax revenue is used to nance
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the lump-sum transfer bt and the fraction 1   t is used to nance public education per
child et. Parents working in period t receive lump-sum transfers and children born in
period t benet from public education. The government budget constraint is
tyt = ttyt| {z }
=bt
+(1  t)tyt| {z }
=et
; (11)
where yt =
1
2
yPt +
1
2
yRt is the average income in period t.
Using Equations (7), (8), (9), (10), and (11), the policy preference of the poor and
rich parents are given by
V Pt (t; t) = ln c^
P
t (t; t) + ~qt+1 ln
 
et (s^
P
t (t; t))
AL

+ (1  ~qt+1) ln
 
et (s^
P
t (t; t))
AH

;
V Rt (t; t) = ln c^
R
t (t; t) + ~qt+1 ln
 
et (s^
R
t (t; t))
AH

+ (1  ~qt+1) ln
 
et (s^
R
t (t; t))
AL

;
where c^it(t; t) =
1
1+
 
(1   t)yit + ttyt

, s^it(t; t) =

1+
 
(1   t)yit + ttyt

; et = (1  
t)tyt, ~qt+1 = c   d 

et   ln
 
s^Rt (t; t)=s^
P
t (t; t)

, and the terms unrelated to voting
are omitted from the expression.
The present study assumes probabilistic voting, where the two parties, for example,
Left and Right, compete for votes (see Persson and Tabellini (2000) for an outline on
probabilistic voting). The advantage of this approach is to obtain a solution for multi-
dimensional voting in a tractable way and demonstrate the conict of interest between
voters in a simple manner. Under the assumption of probabilistic voting, each party
proposes a set of policies that maximizes the biased social welfare function, given by
W (t; t) = !V
P
t (t; t) + V
R
t (t; t); (12)
where ! stands for the relative political power of the poor. If ! = 1, the political power
is balanced between the rich and poor, and if ! > (<)1, the power is biased toward the
poor (rich).
Denition 1 A period-t political equilibrium is a pair of policies, ( t ; 

t ), which max-
imizes the winning party's objective function W , given by Equation (12): f t ; t g =
arg max
t;t
W (t; t).
For the tractability of analysis, we impose the following assumption.
Assumption 1
B  d  (lnAH   lnAL) < 1; B < ! < 1=B (13)
exp

1  c
d
+ et   (1 mt)q +mt(1  q)
d

 (1  t)y
R
t + bt
(1  t)yPt + bt
 exp

1  c
d
+ et

: (14)
The rst assumption in (13) ensures @
2W
@2t
< 0 and @
2W
@2t
< 0, that is, the winning party's
objective function is concave in t and t. The second assumption in (14) ensures that
t+1 is set within the range [0; 1]. Under Assumption 1, the following result is obtained.
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Proposition 1 We denote ~!t  By
R
t +y
P
t
yRt +By
P
t
as a critical value of !. A period-t political
equilibrium pair of policies, ( t ; 

t ), is given as follows:8<:
 t 2 (0; 1) and t = 0 for B < !  ~!t;
 t 2 (0; 1) and t 2 (0; 1) for ~!t < ! < 1;
 t = 1 and 

t 2 (0; 1) for 1  ! < 1B :
Proof. See Appendix A.3.
This proposition states that a pair of equilibrium policies, ( t ; 

t ), depends on the
relative political power of the poor, !. First, when the power of the poor is weak, such
that B < !  ~!t, there is a strong bias toward the rich; the winning party implements
a policy in favor of the rich. In particular, there is no provision of lump-sum transfer
because the rich pay more than they receive through the lump-sum transfer and thus,
prefer public education to a lump-sum transfer. Second, when the power of the poor
is moderate, such that ~!t < ! < 1, the winning party takes care of both the rich and
poor, and thus, provides both redistribution policies (i.e., lump-sum transfer and public
education). Finally, when the power of the poor is strong, such that 1  ! < 1=B, the
attitude of the winning party is further biased toward the poor. The party still provides
both a lump-sum transfer and public education, but imposes the maximum tax rate, that
is, t = 1, to maximize the lump-sum transfer that benets the poor.
In Figure 5, the tax rate t and the fraction t in the present model, (

t ; 

t ), are
compared with those in Bernasconi and Profeta's (2012) model. From the gure, we see
that for any bias !, the present model realizes a lower level of government expenditure
on the lump-sum transfer-to-GDP ratio, bt=yt = tt, and a higher level of government
expenditure on public education-to-GDP ratio, et=yt = (1 t)t, than those in Bernasconi
and Profeta's (2012) model.
[Figure 5 here.]
To better understand this dierence, let us consider the marginal impact of an increase
in the share of lump-sum transfer, denoted by t, on the winning party's objective function.
Recall that W (t; t) represents the winning party's objective function in the present
model. Let W^ (t; t) denote the winning party's objective function in Bernasconi and
Profeta's (2012) model. Using the Envelope Theorem, the rst derivatives of W (t; t)
and W^ (t; t) with respect to t are connected in the following way:
@W (t; t)
@t
=
@W^ (t; t)
@t
+ !
(+)z }| {
@~qt+1
@s^Rt
(+)z}|{
@s^Rt
@bt
(+)z}|{
@bt
@t
( )z }| {
ln
AL
AH

| {z }
(a)
+
( )z }| {
@~qt+1
@s^Pt
(+)z}|{
@s^Pt
@bt
(+)z}|{
@bt
@t
(+)z }| {
ln
AH
AL

| {z }
(b)
:
Terms (a) and (b) in the above expression show the dierence in the marginal impact of
t between the two models.
Terms (a) and (b) present externalities through education, which are peculiar to the
present model. Term (a) shows the external eect on the poor through private investment
by the rich. An increase in t creates a positive income eect on the rich; they increase
investment in private education. This increases the probability that their children will be
8
rich, but at the same time, reduces the probability that the poor-born children will be rich.
An increase in t has a negative eect on the poor through educational investment by the
rich. Term (b) shows a mirror-image eect. An increase in t increases the probability
that the poor-born children will be rich, but at the same time, reduces the probability
that the rich-born children will be rich. Because of these negative external eects on the
probability of being rich, the rich and poor in the present model prefer a lower share of
lump-sum transfer than that in Bernasconi and Profeta's (2012) model.
4 GDP and Mobility
In this section, we analyze the dynamic motion of GDP and social mobility across periods.
We rst introduce the production function in the present model economy in Subsection
4.1. Then, we derive the equation that presents the motion of GDP in Subsection 4.2 and
numerically demonstrate the dynamics of GDP and social mobility in Subsection 4.3.
4.1 Production Function
Recall the formation of human capital in Equation (6). Given the two income classes of
period-t adult, the human capital in period-t+1 adulthood is classied into the following
four classes: hP;Lt+1 = e

t (s
P
t )
H

tA
L, hP;Ht+1 = e

t (s
P
t )
H

tA
H , hR;Lt+1 = e

t (s
R
t )
H

tA
L, and
hR;Ht+1 = e

t (s
R
t )
H

tA
H . Because there are four types of human capital, it is natural to
consider four income classes. However, this implies that the number of income classes
increases with time, which makes it dicult to analytically solve the model. For the
tractability of the analysis, we make the following simplication. Workers in period t+ 1
are allocated to either of the following two types of income occupations: high income
occupation when a worker is recognized by a rm as a high ability worker, and low
income occupation when a worker is recognized by a rm as a low ability worker. Under
this assumption, these are the two income classes across periods.
Following Bernasconi and Profeta (2012), we assume that among the workers, two
are selected and paired at random and engage in production according to the following
Leontie-type production function:
xt+1 = 2min

hlt+1; h
h
t+1
	
;
where xt+1 is the output produced by a pair of workers. The nal output is xt+1 = 2h
l
t+1
if at least one worker has low ability; xt+1 = 2h
h
t+1 if both workers have high ability.
To understand the meaning of the production function, let us consider a case where a
high ability worker is allocated to a low income occupation because of talent mismatch.
When paired with a low ability worker, he/she must coordinate with a low ability worker
for work, resulting in low productivity. Alternatively, consider a case where a low ability
worker is allocated to a high income occupation owing to a talent mismatch. When paired
with a high ability worker, the latter must coordinate with the former for work, resulting
in low productivity. Therefore, the Leontie production function in Equation (16) enables
us to demonstrate how a mismatch of talents is associated with production eciency.
To compute the aggregate production in the economy, we classify workers with respect
to his/her parent's income occupation, own ability, and own income occupation. The
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classication is indexed by fparent's income occupation, own ability, and own income
occupationg. The rst group includes workers who have the same ability as their parents'
income occupation and belong to the occupation reecting their ability. They are indexed
by fhigh, high, highg and flow, low, lowg, and their fraction in the population is denoted
by t+1. The second group includes workers who have abilities that dier from their
parents' income occupation, but belong to the occupation reecting their ability: they
experience social mobility. They are indexed by flow, high, highg and fhigh, low, lowg,
and their fraction is denoted by t+1. Given the denition of mt+1; we have mt+1 =
t+1 + t+1. The third group includes workers who have abilities that dier from their
parents' income occupation and are employed in an occupation that is inconsistent with
their ability: they experience a talent mismatch. They are indexed by fhigh, low, highg
and flow, high, lowg, and their fraction is 1 mt+1.
4.2 Dynamic Motion of GDP
To demonstrate the motion of GDP in the economy, note that GDP, which is equivalent
to the aggregate output in the economy, is determined as follows:
yt+1 =
1
2
yPt+1 +
1
2
yRt+1; (15)
where yPt+1 and y
R
t+1 are the average outputs in the low and high income occupations. They
are the weighted average of human capital belonging to each occupation. Therefore, yPt+1
and yRt+1 are given as follows:
yPt+1 = t+1(2  t+1)hP;Lt+1 + ( 2t+1   2t+1t+1 + 2t+1)hR;Lt+1 + (1  t+1   t+1)2hP;Ht+1 ;
(16)
yRt+1 =
 
1  (t+1 + t+1)2

hR;Lt+1 + t+1(t+1 + 2t+1)h
P;H
t+1 + 
2
t+1h
R;H
t+1 : (17)
The derivation of Equations (16) and (17) is given in Appendix A.4.
The dynamic equation of the average human capital is given by
H t+1 =
1
2
et(t+1; s
R
t ; s
P
t )H

t ; (18)
where (; ; ) is dened by
(t+1; s
R
t ; s
P
t ) =
 
t+1(s
P
t )
 + (1  t+1)(sRt )

AL +
 
(1  t+1)(sPt ) + t+1(sRt )

AH :
Using Equations (15), (16), (17), and (18), we can write down the relationship between
GDP and the average human capital at time t as follows:
yt+1 = F (t+1; t+1; s
R
t ; s
P
t )H t+1; (19)
where
F (t+1; t+1; s
R
t ; s
P
t ) =
(t+1; t+1; s
R
t ; s
P
t )
(t+1; sRt ; s
P
t )
and
(t+1; t+1; s
R
t ; s
P
t ) =
 
t+1(2  t+1)(sPt ) + ( 22t+1   2t+1   4t+1t+1 + 2t+1 + 1)(sRt )

AL
+
 
(22t+1 + 
2
t+1 + 4t+1t+1   2t+1   2t+1 + 1)(sPt ) + 2t+1(sRt )

AH :
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The function F presents the eciency of the use of human capital in production. If F = 1,
there is no waste of human capital: production is ecient. If 0 < F < 1, there is a waste
of human capital: production is inecient.
From Equations (18) and (19), the dynamic motion of GDP is presented by
yt+1 =
1
2
(et)
| {z }
(a)
(t+1; t+1; s
R
t ; s
P
t )| {z }
(b)

yt
F (t; t; sRt 1; s
P
t 1)

| {z }
(c)
: (20)
Terms (a) and (b) in Equation (20) present human capital formation through public and
private education; term (b) shows production ineciency resulting from the mismatch of
talents. Term (c) presents the average human capital in period t.
4.3 Numerical Analysis
This subsection presents the dynamics of GDP and social mobility on the basis of a
numerical analysis. The parameters are set to satisfy yRt > y
P
t and ~qt+1 2 [0; 1]. They are
given by  = 0:2;  = 0:2;  = 0:2; AL = 1; AH = 5; c = 0:65; d = 0:1; q = 0:4; yP1 =
1; yR1 = 4; y1 =
1
2
yP1 +
1
2
yR1 = 2:5; m1 = 1, and H1 = 2:5. There is no mismatch of
talents in period 1.
The numerical result suggests that the dynamic motion of GDP and social mobility
depends on the relative political power of the poor. In particular, when the political power
of the poor is large, such that ! = 1, GDP and social mobility monotonically converge to
the steady state, as illustrated in Figure 6. In this case, the tax rate is 100% (Proposition
1). Because of the 100% taxation, there is no dierence in after-tax income between
the rich and poor; the private investment gap between them is negligible. In addition, a
100% taxation enables the government to spend a substantial amount on public education.
Therefore, the positive eect of public education on social mobility dominates the negative
eect of a private investment gap, resulting in a monotone convergence of GDP and social
mobility as that in the Bernasconi and Profeta's (2012) model.
[Figure 6 here.]
The result signicantly changes when the political power of the poor is weak, such that
! = 0:3. In this case, GDP and social mobility cyclically converge to the steady state
levels, as illustrated in Figure 7. The mechanism underlying the result, which is illustrated
in Figure 8, is as follows. First, consider the period-1 government. Given the low political
power of the poor, the period-1 government chooses a low tax rate and a small transfer
to reduce the tax burden of the rich. There remains income inequality between the rich
and poor after the implementation of the lump-sum transfer. The inequality produces a
private investment gap between them. The gap creates a negative eect on mobility from
period 1 to period 2, which dominates the positive eect of public education on mobility.
[Figures 7 and 8 here.]
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A decline in mobility increases the mismatch of talents in period 2.2 This creates a
negative eect on GDP, which dominates the positive eect of human capital accumula-
tion. A decrease in GDP implies a small gap in private investment between the rich and
poor. Therefore, the negative eect of the gap on mobility is dominated by the positive
eect of public education; mobility increases from period 2 to period 3. Appendix A.5
provides a formal proof of the statement here.
An increase in mobility reduces the mismatch of talents in period 3. That is, the
eect on the mismatch of talents in period 3 is contrary to that in period 2. A decrease
in the mismatch results in an increase in GDP. This strengthens income inequality in
period 3 and thus, widens the gap of private investment between the rich and poor: this
is qualitatively equivalent to that observed in period 1. Therefore, the process described
thus far continues in every two periods.
5 Concluding Remarks
This paper presents an overlapping-generations model featuring social mobility between
two classes, the rich and poor, and investigates the role of private education in considering
social mobility. Mobility is reduced by the mismatch of talents, which is aected by private
and public education. Public education mitigates the mismatch and encourages mobility,
whereas the gap in private education investment between the rich and poor strengthens the
mismatch and discourages mobility. In this setting, social mobility increases (decreases)
when the positive eect of public education dominates (is dominated by) a negative eect
of the gap in private education investment. We introduce two redistributive policies,
lump-sum transfer and public education, into the model and examine the interaction
between mobility and redistributive policies.
The analysis shows that the dynamics of social mobility depends on the relative polit-
ical power between the rich and poor. When the political power of the poor is strong, the
government implements redistributive policies favoring the poor: a high tax rate and high
level of public education spending. A high tax rate leads to low income inequality and a
small gap in private education investment between the rich and poor. Hence, a negative
eect of the private investment gap on social mobility is dominated by the positive eect
of public education, resulting in a monotone convergence of social mobility.
However, when the poor have weak political power, the government implements re-
distributive policies favoring the rich: a low tax rate and low level of public education
spending, resulting in a two-period cycle of income inequality. In a high inequality (low
inequality) period, a negative eect of the gap in private education investment on social
mobility dominates (is dominated by) a positive eect of public education. The social
mobility cyclically converges to the steady state. The two dierent patterns of social
mobility might be interpreted as providing a possible explanation for the dierent trends
of social mobility among certain developed countries in the past decades. The analysis
implies that private education, which is peculiar to the present framework, is a crucial
factor in the dierent motions of social mobility.
2The mismatch of talent is also aected by the fraction of workers allocated to the correct social class
with a probability 1, t. We ignore this eect in the demonstration of the mechanism since it is not a
qualitatively crucial factor in explaining the cyclical motion of GDP and social mobility.
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A Appendix
A.1 Derivation of Equation (2)
Transmission of innate ability
Transmission, q No transmission, 1  q
Parent's Correct, mt Type A Type B
social class Wrong, 1 mt Type C Type D
Table A.1: Classication of workers in period t + 1 per transmission of their parents'
innate ability and social classes
As shown in Table A.1, workers in period t+1 can be classied into four types according
to the transmission of innate ability from their parents to them and their parents' social
classes. Given assumptions (A1) and (A2), type A and type D workers are allocated to
the correct social class with a probability 1. Type B and type C workers are allocated to
the correct social class with the probability t+1. Using this classication, Equation (2)
is obtained:
mt+1 = mtq|{z}
type A
+(1 mt)qt+1| {z }
type B
+mt(1  q)t+1| {z }
type C
+(1 mt)(1  q)| {z }
type D
= mtq + (1 mt)(1  q) +

(1 mt)q +mt(1  q)

t+1
= 2 

c  d 

et   ln
 
sRt =s
P
t
  q +mt(2q   1):

A.2 Derivation of Equation (3)
Given the classication in Table A.1 and assumptions (A1) and (A2), type A and type
D workers are allocated to a social class, which is identical to that of their parents with
probability 1. Type B and type C workers are allocated to social class, which is identical
to that of their parents' with probability 1  t+1. Using this classication, Equation (3)
is obtained:
~qt+1 = mtq|{z}
type A
+mt(1  q)(1  t+1)| {z }
type B
+(1 mt)q(1  t+1)| {z }
type C
+(1  q)(1 mt)| {z }
type D
= 1 

(1 mt)q +mt(1  q)

t+1
= c  d 

et   ln
 
sRt =s
P
t

:

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A.3 Proof of Proposition 1
The procedure of the proof of Proposition 1 is identical to that in Bernasconi and Profeta
(2007, 2012). The rst- and second-order derivatives of t and t are obtained as follows:
@W
@t
= (!  B)  y
P
t + tyt
(1  t)yPt + ttyt
+ (1  !B)  y
R
t + tyt
(1  t)yRt + ttyt
+
1 + !
t
  B(1  !)(1  t)yt;
(A.1)
@W
@t
= (!  B) tyt
(1  t)yPt + ttyt
+ (1  !B) tyt
(1  t)yRt + ttyt
  1 + !
1  t  +B(1  !)tyt;
(A.2)
@2W
@ 2t
=  (!  B)
  yPt + tyt
(1  t)yPt + ttyt
2
  (1  !B)
  yRt + tyt
(1  t)yRt + ttyt
2
  1 + !
 2t
;
@2W
@2t
=  (!  B)

tyt
(1  t)yPt + ttyt
2
  (1  !B)

tyt
(1  t)yRt + ttyt
2
  1 + !
(1  t)2 :
Given B < 1 and B < ! < 1=B from Assumption 1, @
2W
@2t
< 0 and @
2W
@2t
< 0 hold. Note that
limt!0
@W
@t
= +1, limt!1 @W@t =  1, limt!1 @W@t

t=0
=  1, and limt!0 @Wt

t=1
=
+1. Therefore, the optimal pair of policies, ( t ; t ), can be classied into the following
three types: t 2 (0; 1) and t = 0, t = 1 and t 2 (0; 1), and t 2 (0; 1) and t 2 (0; 1).
All variable are indexed by t, so we omit the index t from the expressions.
 Case 1  ! < 1=B
Suppose that 1  ! < 1=B. The following inequality holds:
(!   1)(B + 1)  0, !  B  1  !B: (A.3)
To simplify the notations, we dene the functions as follows:
C(; ; !)  (!  B)  y
P + y
(1  )yPt + y
+ (1  !B)  y
R + y
(1  )yR + y ;
D(; ; !)  1 + !

  B(1  !)(1  )y:
Given these denitions, we can rewrite (A.1) as @W=@ = C(; ; !) +D(; ; !).
We obtain the rst derivatives of C(; ; !) with respect to  as follows:
@C(; ; !)
@
=  (! B)
  yP + y
(1  )yP + y
2
 (1 !B)
  yR + y
(1  )yR + y
2
< 0: (A.4)
To compute the optimal pair of policies, we perform four steps. In step 1, we show
that C(1; 1; 1) = 0. In step 2, we show that C(; ; !) +D(; ; !) > C(; 1; 1) for ,
such that @W
@
j= = 0. In step 3, we show that if the optimal solution exists, it is a pair
of policies, (  = 1,  2 (0; 1)). In step 4, we show that such an equilibrium uniquely
exists and compute the value of  2 (0; 1).
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Step 1.
Given the denition of C(; ; !), we have
C(; 1; 1) = (1 B)  y
P + y
(1  )yP + y + (1 B)
 yR + y
(1  )yR + y
=
1
2
(yR   yP )(1 B)
 
1
(1  )yP + y  
1
(1  )yR + y
!
: (A.5)
Hence, we obtain
C(1; 1; 1) = 0: (A.6)
Step 2.
Let  satisfy @W
@
j= = 0. Then, we can rewrite (A.2) as follows:
(!  B) y
(1  )yP + y + (1  !B)
y
(1  )yR + y =
1 + !
1     B(1  !)y
, (!  B) (1  
)y
(1  )yP + y + (1  !B)
(1  )y
(1  )yR + y =
1 + !

  B(1  !)(1  )y
, (!  B) (1  
)y
(1  )yP + y + (1  !B)
(1  )y
(1  )yR + y = D(; 
; !): (A.7)
Suppose that  2 (0; 1) and yR > yP . Given (A.3), we have 
!  B
(1  )yP + y  
1  !B
(1  )yR + y
!
 
 
!  B
(1  )yP + y  
1  !B
(1  )yR + y
!
= (1  )y
 
!  B 
(1  )yP + y (1  )yP + y   1  !B (1  )yR + y (1  )yR + y
!
> 0: (A.8)
Given 1  ! < 1=B, yR > yP , (A.5), (A.7), and (A.8), we obtain
C(; ; !) +D(; ; !) = (!  B)  y
P + y
(1  )yP + y + (1  !B)
 yR + y
(1  )yR + y
+ (!  B) (1  
)y
(1  )yP + y + (1  !B)
(1  )y
(1  )yR + y
=
1
2
(yR   yP )
 
!  B
(1  )yP + y  
1  !B
(1  )yR + y
!
>
1
2
(yR   yP )
 
!  B
(1  )yP + y  
1  !B
(1  )yR + y
!
 1
2
(yR   yP )(1 B)
 
1
(1  )yP + y  
1
(1  )yR + y
!
= C(; 1; 1):
(A.9)
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Step 3.
Given (A.4), (A.6), and (A.9), the following inequality holds:
@W
@

=
= C(; ; !) +D(; ; !)
> C(; 1; 1)
 C(1; 1; 1)
= 0:
(A.10)
Given @2W=@ 2 < 0 and (A.10), we nd that   = 1 is optimal when the optimal fraction
 is internal.
Step 4.
First, we show the existence and uniqueness of  we considered in step 3 in the
interval (0; 1). Given lim!1 @W@ =  1, lim!0 @W@

=1
= +1, and @2W=@2 < 0, we
nd that  uniquely exists in the interval (0; 1).
Next, we show that a pair of policies, ( 2 (0; 1);  = 0), is not optimal. Suppose that
 2 (0; 1) and  = 0. Given (A.1), we obtain the following equation:
@W
@

2(0;1);=0
= 0, 
1   (! + 1)(1 B) = (1 + !)  B(1  !)y: (A.11)
Substituting (A.11) into (A.2) leads to
@W
@

2(0;1);=0
= (!  B) y
(1  )yP + (1  !B)
y
(1  )yR  

1   (1 + !)(1 B)
=

1  
 
(!  B) y
yP
+ (1  !B) y
yR
  (1 + !)(1 B)
!
=

2(1  )
 
(!  B)y
R
yP
+ (1  !B)y
P
yR
  (1 + !)(1 B)
!
:
Therefore, the following property holds:
@W
@

2(0;1);=0
R 0, (!  B)y
R
yP
+ (1  !B)y
P
yR
  (1 + !)(1 B) R 0
,
 
yR
yP
!2
+
1  !B
!  B  
(1 + !)(1 B)
!  B 
yR
yP
R 0
,
 
yR
yP
  1  !B
!  B
! 
yR
yP
  1
!
R 0:
(A.12)
Given yR > yP and (A.3), @W
@

2(0;1);=0
> 0 holds, which implies that a pair of policies,
( 2 (0; 1);  = 0), cannot be optimal.
We now compute the value of , which solves the following equation:
@W
@

=1
= 0, f() = 0;
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where f() is dened as follows:
f()  B(!   1)y2    (1 + !)(1 B) + (1 + !) +B(!   1)y + (1 + !)(1 B):
Note that the coecient of 2 is positive and f() has the following properties:
f(0) = (1 B)(1 + !) > 0;
f(1) =  (1 + !) < 0:
Therefore, we obtain the value of  as follows:
 =
E  pE2   4B(!   1)y(1 + !)(1 B)
2B(!   1)y ;
where E is dened by E  (1 + !)(1 B) + (1 + !) +B(!   1)y.
 Case B < ! < 1
First, we show that  = 1 cannot be optimal when B < ! < 1. Recall that the optimal
pair of policies can be classied into the following three types:  2 (0; 1) and  = 0,  = 1
and  2 (0; 1), and  2 (0; 1) and  2 (0; 1). Therefore, if  = 1 is optimal, the optimal
 is ^ 2 (0; 1), which satises the following equation:
@W
@

=1;=^
= 0, 1  ^
^
(1 + !)(1 B) = (1 + !)  B(1  !)(1  ^)y: (A.13)
Suppose that  = 1,  = ^, B < ! < 1, and yR > yP . We obtain
@W
@

=1;=^
= (!  B) y
P + ^y
^y
+ (1  !B) y
R + ^y
^y
+ (1 + !)  B(1  !)(1  ^)y
= (!  B) y
P + ^y
^y
+ (1  !B) y
R + ^y
^y
+
1  ^
^
(1 + !)(1 B)
=
1
2^y
(yR   yP )(!   1)(1 +B)
< 0;
(A.14)
where the second line uses (A.13). Given @2W=@ 2 < 0; lim!0 @W@ = +1, and (A.14),
we nd that a pair of policies, ( = 1; ^ 2 (0; 1)), cannot be optimal.
Hence, the optimal pair of policies can be of the following two types:  2 (0; 1) and
 = 0, and  2 (0; 1) and  2 (0; 1). Given @2W=@2 < 0 and lim!1 @W@ =  1, (i) a
pair of policies, ( 2 (0; 1);  = 0), is optimal if @W
@

2(0;1);=0  0 holds and (ii) a pair of
policies, ( 2 (0; 1);  2 (0; 1)), is optimal if @W
@

2(0;1);=0 > 0 holds. Given (A.12), we
can rewrite these conditions as follows:
@W
@

2(0;1);=0
R 0, y
R
yP
R 1  !B
!  B , ! R
ByR + yP
yR +ByP
:
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 Sub-case B < !  ByR+yP
yR+ByP
In this case, a pair of policies, (  2 (0; 1);  = 0), is optimal. Therefore,   solves
the following equation:
@W
@

=0
= 0, g() = 0;
where g() is dened as follows:
g()  B(1  !)y 2   ((1 + !)(1 B) + (1 + !) +B(1  !)y) + (1 + !):
Note that the coecient of  2 is positive and g() has the following properties:
g(0) = (1 + !) > 0;
g(1) =  (1 + !)(1 B) < 0:
Therefore, we obtain the value of   as follows:
  =
F  pF 2   4B(1  !)(1 + !)y
2B(1  !)y ;
where F is dened by F  (1 + !)(1 B) + (1 + !) +B(1  !)y.
 Sub-case ByR+yP
yR+ByP
< ! < 1
In this case, a pair of policies, (  2 (0; 1);  2 (0; 1)), is optimal. Therefore,   and
 solve the following equations:
@W
@
= 0
,  (!  B) ( y
P + y)
(1  )yP + y   (1  !B)
( yR + y)
(1  )yR + y = (1 + !)  B(1  !)(1  )y;
(A.15)
@W
@
= 0
, (!  B) y(1  )
(1  )yP + y + (1  !B)
y(1  )
(1  )yR + y = (1 + !)  B(1  !)(1  )y:
(A.16)
Substituting (A.15) into (A.16) and rearranging the terms, we obtain
!  B
(1  )yP + y =
1  !B
(1  )yR + y (A.17)
,  = (1  )
 
(!  B)yR   (1  !B)yP 
(1  !)(1 +B)y : (A.18)
Substituting (A.17) into (A.16) results in
2(1  !B) (1  )y
(1  )yR + y = (1 + !)  B(1  !)(1  )y
, (1  ) = (1 + !)(1  )(y
R   yP )
(1  !) 2(1 +B) +B(1  )(yR   yP )y : (A.19)
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To eliminate  from (A.19), substituting (A.18) into (A.19) gives us
   (1  )((!  B)y
R   (1  !B)yP )
(1  !)(1 +B)y =
(1 + !)(1  )(yR   yP )
(1  !)(2(1 +B) +B(1  )(yR   yP ))y
, h() = 0;
where h() is dened as follows:
h() =
1
2
B(1 B)(1 + !)(yR   yP )2 2  
n
y(1  !)(1 +B)2(1 +B) +B(yR   yP )
+ 2

(!  B)yR   (1  !B)yP 1 + B +B(yR   yP )+ (1 +B)(1 + !)(yR   yP )o
+

2(1 +B) + B(yR   yP )(!  B)yR   (1  !B)yP + (1 + !)(1 +B)(yR   yP ):
Note that the coecient of  2 is positive and h() has the following properties:
h(0) =

2(1 +B) +B(yR   yP )(!  B)yR   (1  !B)yP + (1 + !)(1 +B)(yR   yP ) > 0;
h(1) =  2y(1  !)(1 +B)2 < 0:
Therefore, we obtain the value of   as follows:
  =
G pG2   2B(1 B)(1 + !)(yR   yP )2I
B(1 B)(1 + !)(yR   yP )2 ; (A.20)
where G and I are dened as follows:
G =y(1  !)(1 +B)2(1 +B) +B(yR   yP )+ 2(!  B)yR   (1  !B)yP 
 1 +B +B(yR   yP )+ (1 +B)(1 + !)(yR   yP );
I =

2(1 +B) +B(yR   yP )(!  B)yR   (1  !B)yP + (1 + !)(1 +B)(yR   yP ):
Substituting (A.20) into (A.18), the value of  is obtained as follows:
 =
(1   ) (!  B)yR   (1  !B)yP 
(1  !)(1 +B) y :

A.4 Derivation of Equations (16) and (17)
Table A.2 summarizes the information on the allocation of workers and output levels in
the low income occupation. From the result presented in Table A.2, we can compute yPt+1
as follows.
yPt+1 =
 
2t+1 + 2t+1t+1 + 2t+1(1  t+1   t+1)

hP;Lt+1
+
 
2t+1 + 2t+1(1  t+1   t+1)

hR;Lt+1 + (1  t+1   t+1)2hP;Ht+1
= t+1(2  t+1)hP;Lt+1 + ( 2t+1   2t+1t+1 + 2t+1)hR;Lt+1 + (1  t+1   t+1)2hP;Ht+1 :
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Output level Pair of workers Fraction in low income occupation
(hP;Lt+1; h
P;L
t+1) 
2
t+1
2hP;Lt+1 (h
P;L
t+1; h
R;L
t+1) 2t+1t+1
(hP;Lt+1; h
P;H
t+1 ) 2t+1(1  t+1   t+1)
2hR;Lt+1 (h
R;L
t+1 ; h
R;L
t+1) 
2
t+1
(hR;Lt+1 ; h
P;H
t+1 ) 2t+1(1  t+1   t+1)
2hP;Ht+1 (h
P;H
t+1 ; h
P;H
t+1 ) (1  t+1   t+1)2
Table A.2: Pairs of workers and their fractions and output level in low income occupation
in period t+ 1
Output level Pair of workers Fraction in the high income occupation
(hR;Lt+1 ; h
R;L
t+1) (1  t+1   t+1)2
2hR;Lt+1 (h
R;L
t+1 ; h
P;H
t+1 ) 2(1  t+1   t+1)t+1
(hR;Lt+1 ; h
R;H
t+1 ) 2t+1(1  t+1   t+1)
2hP;Ht+1 (h
P;H
t+1 ; h
P;H
t+1 ) 
2
t+1
(hP;Ht+1 ; h
R;H
t+1 ) 2t+1t+1
2hR;Ht+1 (h
R;H
t+1 ; h
R;H
t+1 ) 
2
t+1
Table A.3: Pairs of workers and their fractions and output level in high income occupation
in period t+ 1
Table A.3 summarizes the information on the allocation of workers and output levels
in the high income occupation. From the result presented in Table A.3, we can compute
yPt+1 as follows:
yRt+1 =
 
(1  t+1   t+1)2 + 2(1  t+1   t+1)t+1 + 2t+1(1  t+1   t+1)

hR;Lt+1
+ (2t+1 + 2t+1t+1)h
P;H
t+1 + 
2
t+1h
R;H
t+1
=
 
1  (t+1 + t+1)2

hR;Lt+1 + t+1(t+1 + 2t+1)h
P;H
t+1 + 
2
t+1h
R;H
t+1 :

A.5 Mismatch of Talents, GDP, and Pre-tax Inequality
Using Equations (16) and (17), the following equations are obtained:
@yPt+1
@t+1
= 2(1 mt+1)(hR;Lt+1   hP;Ht+1 ); (A.21)
@yRt+1
@t+1
= 2mt+1(h
P;H
t+1   hR;Lt+1); (A.22)
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If hP;Ht+1  hR;Lt+1 is satised, @y
P
t+1
@t+1
 0, and @yRt+1
@t+1
 0 hold. This implies that a higher level
of social mobility results in a larger level of pre-tax inequality between the rich and the
poor.
From Equations (15), (A.21), and (A.22), the following equations are obtained:
@yt+1
@t+1
=
1
2
@yPt+1
@t+1
+
1
2
@yRt+1
@t+1
= (1 mt+1)(hR;Lt+1   hP;Ht+1 ) +mt+1(hP;Ht+1   hR;Lt+1)
= (1  2mt+1)(hR;Lt+1   hP;Ht+1 ):
If hP;Ht+1  hR;Lt+1 and mt+1  1=2 are satised, @yt+1@t+1  0 holds.
We now turn to verify whether hP;Ht+1  hR;Lt+1 and mt+1  1=2 for all t are satised.
[Figure A.1 here.]
As shown in Figure A.1, hP;Ht+1  hR;Lt+1 and mt+1  1=2 for all t are satised in the
present numerical analysis. Therefore,
@yPt+1
@t+1
 0, @yRt+1
@t+1
 0, and @yt+1
@t+1
 0 hold for all t.

A.6 Numerical Algorithm
We describe the numerical procedure to simulate the dynamics of GDP, aggregate human
capital, social mobility, and the fraction of workers who have the same ability as their
parents and belong to the occupation reecting their innate ability. It is enough to use
GDP to check economic convergence because it summarizes all the information on the
economy. The procedure is as follows.
Step 1.
We set initial values yP1 ; y
R
1 ; y1; H1, and m1.
Step 2.
Given yPt ; y
R
t ; yt; H t, and mt for any t, we obtain y
P
t+1; y
R
t+1; yt+1; H t+1;mt+1 using the
following equations:
1. t =
8>><>>:
F 
p
F 2 4B(1 !)(1+!)yt
2B(1 !)yt if B < !  ~!t;
G 
p
G2 2B(1 B)(1+!)(yRt  yPt )2I
B(1 B)(1+!)(yRt  yPt )2
if ~!t < ! < 1;
1 if 1  ! < 1=B;
where
F =(1 + !)(1 B) + (1 + !) +B(1  !)yt;
G =yt(1  !)(1 +B)

2(1 +B) + B(yRt   yPt )

+ 2

(!  B)yRt   (1  !B)yPt

 1 +B +B(yRt   yPt )+ (1 +B)(1 + !)(yRt   yPt );
I =

2(1 +B) +B(yRt   yPt )

(!  B)yRt   (1  !B)yPt

+ (1 + !)(1 +B)(yRt   yPt );
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2. t =
8>><>>:
0 if B < !  ~!t;
(1 t)
 
(! B)yRt  (1 !B)yPt

(1 !)(1+B)tyt if ~!t < ! < 1;
E 
p
E2 4B(! 1)yt(1+!)(1 B)
2B(! 1)yt if 1  ! < 1=B;
where E = (1 + !)(1 B) + (1 + !)  B(1  !)yt;
3. bt = ttyt;
4. et = (1  t)tyt;
5. sjt =

1+
((1  t)yjt + bt); j = P;R;
6. hi;jt+1 = e

t (s
j
t)
H

tA
i; i = L;H; j = P;R;
7. t+1 = 1  c+ d(et   ln(sRt =sPt ));
8. t+1 = mtq + (1 mt)(1  q);
9. mt+1 = t+1 + t+1;
10. H t+1 =
1
2
t+1h
P;L
t+1 +
1
2
(1  t+1)hR;Lt+1 + 12(1  t+1)hP;Ht+1 + 12t+1hR;Ht+1 ;
11. yPt+1 = t+1(2  t+1)hP;Lt+1 + t+1(2  2t+1   t+1)hR;Lt+1 + (1  t+1   t+1)hP;Ht+1 ;
12. yRt+1 =
 
1  (t+1 + t+1)2

hR;Lt+1 + t+1(t+1 + 2t+1)h
P;H
t+1 + 
2
t+1h
R;H
t+1 ;
13. yt+1 =
1
2
yPt+1 +
1
2
yRt+1:
Step 3.
If
yt+1
yt
  1 is suciently small, we stop iterative calculation. If not, we go back to
step 2.
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Figure 1: Relative proportions of public and private spending on education for all levels
in OECD countries (2011).
Source: OECD (2014) Education at a glance 2014: OECD indicators, OECD Publishing
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Figure 2: Transmission of innate ability from a parent to child
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(a) Case of observable innate ability
?
(b) Case of unobservable innate ability
Figure 3: Determination process of occupation of children born in period t
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Figure 4: Mechanism of the occurrence of social mobility and mismatch of talents
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(a) Government expenditure on lump-sum transfer-to-GDP ratio
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(b) Government expenditure on public education-to-GDP ratio
Figure 5: Panel (a) plots the ratio of lump-sum transfers to GDP. Panel (b) plots the
ratio of public education to GDP. The horizontal axis takes the values of ! in both panels.
The solid curves present the ratios in the present model. The dotted curves present the
ratios in Bernasconi and Profeta's (2012) model. The parameter values are identical to
those in subsection 4.3.
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Figure 6: Panel (a) plots the dynamics of GDP and the average human capital. Panel
(b) plots the dynamics of social mobility. We set ! = 1:0 in both panels. The horizontal
axis takes time in both panels. In Panel (a), the solid curve presents GDP. The dotted
curve presents the average human capital.
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Figure 7: Panels (a) plots the dynamics of GDP and the average human capital in the
present model. Panel (b) plots the dynamics of social mobility in the present model.
Panel (c) plots the dynamics of GDP and the average human capital in Bernasconi and
Profeta's(2012) model. Panel (d) plots the dynamics of social mobility in the model of
Bernasconi and Prifeta (2012). We set ! = 0:3 in all panels. The horizontal axis takes
time in all panels. In Panels (a) and (c), the solid curve presents GDP. The dotted curve
presents the average human capital.
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Figure 8: Mechanism underlying cyclical convergence of GDP and social mobility
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Figure A.1: Panels (a) and (b) plot the dynamics of individual human capital. Panels (b)
and (d) plot the dynamics of the fraction of workers allocated to the correct social class.
We set ! = 0:3 in Panels (a) and (b), and ! = 1:0 in Panels (c) and (d). The horizontal
axis takes time in all panels. In Panels (a) and (c), the solid curve presents the human
capital of workers with high innate ability whose parents are poor. The dotted curve
presents the human capital of workers with low innate ability whose parents are rich.
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